This is reblogged from the Joseph Yu, a fellow BP 2041 Antarctica Expedition, Taiwanese-Canadian MBA graduate currently based in Copenhagen,
poignantly hilarious and illuminating of what the entire UN/UNFCCC/Internaitonal negotiation process or the State of the World Affair is like.
Serena
Here is a part of what went on inside Bella Center, Copenhagen, during the negotiation among 193 nations’ representative, regarding the target setting of CO2 emission reduction —- this is the most crucial, and substantial part of any agreement that can emerge out of COP15, because these numbers will serve as the basis of legally binding targets for the nations.
I will first give a recap (it was a session delayed from morning till 9 PM, and lasted past midnight).
Note that I will simplify each country’s speech, and it won’t be the exact words the Negotiators have said. (I will also use brackets to place additional comments, for those of you who did not follow the climate debate to have an easier time understanding). After that, I will give my personal analysis of the situation.
The Chair (kinda like a judge, sitting in front of all countries’ representatives) begins the session by having the UN staff handing out a chart, with Developed Nations’ committed reduction targets between 2008 ~ 2012 under the Kyoto Protocol. Also in the chart are 3 empty columns of different possible frameworks for 2013 ~ 2020, for numbers to be filled (so the nations only need to agree on which one of the 3 columns to use, and then fill in the essential numbers).
Japan begins: we suggest that nations can pick ANY of the 3 columns they want, instead of all nations using the same chosen column.And on top of that, we suggest that additional options be added …
(which I won’t elaborate here. But it shows that this crucial session starts, after 1 week of fruitless talk, with the expansion of chaos)
Bolivia: due to time constraint, we should not bring in any additional things out that are not in the mandate.
(this directly counters Japan’s proposal)
South Africa: yes, all nations should stick to year 1990 as the base year.
(under the Kyoto Protocol, the countries’ reduction target is measured against a base year, and that base year for 2008~2012 targets is set to be year 1990)
Micronesia: support. We need to have fewer alternatives and streamline the process, as we are running out of time. We have just wasted an entire week.
New Zealand: under Kyoto Protocol, 1990 is the base year for the First Commitment Period (that is 2008 ~ 2012), that is no doubt. However, NOTHING has been said about the measurement basis for the Second Commitment Period or future periods. A suggestion we like to make, is that countries can choose whichever year they want, as the base year to be measured against for future periods, but add an additional column showing its relative % as compared to 1990, so things look clear for all parties.
(this sounds reasonably plausible, but it is essentially to support Japan’s claim to expand complication, considering that we will then have 4 different columns for target numbers)
Canada: In the meeting in Barcelona, nations agreed that every country needs a base year, but it doesn’t mean all countries should necessarily have a COMMON base year.
Sweden (representing the EU, as it is of the EU presidency this year): and we also need to discuss Article 21 of the Kyoto Protocol, which is currently unsolved.
(now … one more issue is brought in, and no number has been filled yet)
UN Chair: we should focus on what this session is about – setting numerical targets. As for Article 21, I will speak to the Chief of Chairs regarding the issue, and perhaps address it in some other session.
Sweden: we challenge that. Who says nations need to seek consent from Chair Chief about a side issue? As far as we know, this is a session about us nations and what we want to discuss.
UN Chair: of course, I did not say that it isn’t.
Micronesia: There is an urgent need to focus. Our topic strays backwards. It might be intended for that or it might be not. Anyway, right now, we should keep the table the way it original is, and move forward. Keep the text as clean as possible so we can focus on the substance. If some nations have needs of exceptions, additional footnotes should do the job without problem. We need to focus on getting a legally binding treaty done.
(the female negotiator of Micronesia talks with convincing authority and a sense of urgency, and makes a lot of sense, however …)
Australia: we support EU
(that means the Swedish representative) regarding that Article 21 be addressed HERE before we move anywhere else. (in addition to this, Australia also brings up further complicated issues regarding how footnotes should be dealt with, which I won’t elaborate in details here)
China: some parties’ speeches are contradicting themselves. They bring in a lot of old issues that are not even about why we are here – setting numbers.
Japan: number is not so simple. There are lots of issues linked. We would like to see New Zealand’s proposal about adding one more column on the screen (there is a huge screen showing the electronic table file, so when nations speak their modifications, staff can change through the computer right away). Or perhaps Madam Chair can show us in new print-outs TOMORROW MORNING.
(when I heard this … I was in shock. I think Developing Nations’ negotiators were shaking their heads)
India (he gave a sigh): always a lot of new variations being brought up … we’ve been negotiating for 2 years. And now no one even knows where we are heading.
Colombia: we support using 1990 as base year, as all nations should.
(and then Colombia volunteers to give its own target, as the first nation in the discussion so far that brings up an ACTUAL NUMBER. But almost 2 hours have gone by already.)
Australia (cuts in quickly, countering against just settling with 1990): we are talking about a legal matter. We take it VERY SERIOUSLY. Maybe you are tired, but we are ready to work on it all night, and all tomorrow night, or for as long as it takes.
Sweden: in today’s morning, the flow of our discussion was interrupted. So now it’s late and we need to work late. We support Australia.
(I am not certain which issue he refers to regarding morning. Perhaps some deadlock between Developing Nations and Developed Nations again)
Nigeria: Let us NOT disturb our “developed country” friends. Let them WORK SERIOUSLY.
(it was under a sarcastic tone, and people laughed)
Bolivia: no one is moving forward … and this will not work. We seek guidance from Madam Chair, please. It is okay that we work all night, but it does not make sense to INVENT things to work on.
China: we are fully ready to work. But we are not moving at the same direction. The more we engage, the more we are apart, it is meaningless. They still bring in the same issues … same old ones that were mentioned in Bangkok, in Bonn …
After consulting with her Chair Panel, the UN Chair proposes that the talk be moved into smaller groups
(it means that no more Observers like me can watch. And each nation only sends 1 key person instead of 2~3 like now, to engage in more intimate negotiations behind closed doors). The UN Chair also says not to add additional things to the text.
Australia: we support the idea of moving to smaller groups. But we are against the non-addition part.
(so they still want to have opportunity to further complicate things)
Venezuela: I am lost. We are not moving anywhere.
New Zealand: the Ministers that are on their way flying here should be the one that can change or decide on the numbers. We are just here to get the text right. The direction of our talk, should be to facilitate Annex I parties (meaning Developed Nations under Kyoto Protocol. This excludes USA as it did not ratify the Protocol) to make commitments, as we are essentially the ones that matter. It should facilitate so that Annex I parties have an easier time making commitments.
Sweden: let’s be frank. For a long time we have seen this coming. For the past months everybody knew a lot of things were deadlocked.
Micronesia: is this what we are doing? “To make parties feel easier to make commitments”? We should think of our obligation to the environment and our future!
To wrap this up, Algeria and Sweden both propose to move to smaller group sessions. USA spoke only once, regarding a certain line of text that mentioned its country (as USA did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, it is only an Observing Nation in this particular talk which is based under the Kyoto Protocol). Bolivia questions the Chair’s intention to move into smaller groups. Switzerland, Canada, Egypt each inquires the Chair once more regarding details of moving into smaller groups.
And the recap here has taken 4 hours, with no progress and no numbers set.
Joseph’s Personal Analysis:
It is obvious that the Developed Nations that voice in this session wish this particular negotiation to fall apart. The attempt is more than apparent, and they do not hide such intention (but the real interest behind this action may vary: building credible threat for other negotiation tracks; forcing the Developing Nations to make concessions in this and other tracks; a grand strategy that stalls the whole conference so countries like Japan will be free from the pre-set obligations that will end in 2012; etc etc). The industrialized countries have long wished to either eliminate Kyoto Protocol obligations for themselves, or drag the Developing Nations in on similar level of obligations. This essentially translate into international power play, tied with strategies for relative economical advancement, and political influence. But that’s another long topic, let’s focus on the schemes of Negotiation here.
The Alliance of the Developed Nations is more well-structured, with Japan, Sweden (EU), Australia, and New Zealand representing the power. Whether pre-determined or simply following Negotiators’ styles, each of these countries actually played a very specific role. Japan is clearly the one that drops bombs. Sweden (representing the entire EU) is the central force and the strongest voice. Australia is a sound supporter, and New Zealand serves as a counter-weight that balances issues, nevertheless further the direction of the coalition.
The Developed Nations (G-77 and China, Least Developed Countries, and Alliance of Small Island States) are not as well organized in this session. They are all feeling frustrated, and each of them voices concerns that are basically repetition of the same sentiment.
Now, for Developing Nations this is unfortunate, because THIS particular track of negotiation (AWG-KP) is what the Developing Nations value the most. Perhaps the industrialized nations ARE better trained in negotiation tactics.
Or, an alternative possibility is, since this is an open session for NGO observers, the Developing Nations wish to play the disheartened victims and send public messages across in order to increase external pressure. However, this should be unlikely as this is not the only session that shows a lack of structure among G-77, LDC, and AOSIS. And if they want the semi-public message to be effective, they should emphasize more on the common good (greater good), instead of individual frustration that has less aspiration value.
Moreover, note the frequency of “support” uttered by the Developed Nations of one another. The Developing Nations on the other hand, are a bit more loose, with stance characterized by frustration that gives nothing but satisfaction to their opponents.
There are a few fundamental issues, aside from the commonly known conflict area that Developing Nations wish to place social economical growth above (or at least parallel to) combating climate change, and that the industrialized nations wish to enclose more global players into the same level of obligation that match theirs:
First of all, in terms of underlying interest, within the broader bracket that all nations’ futures are tied together, each coalition (and nation) essentially focuses on its interest more, because they cannot help but project the relative position of power (taking economy, politics, social, cultural, demographical, and geographical elements all into consideration), and that accounts for major decision-making that is cast upon the long-term spectrum (kinda like Game Theory).
Second of all, in terms of Negotiating Power, the Developed Nations have much better alternatives (the so-called BATNA in Negotiation terms). They possess historically accumulated wealth, technologies, and systems. If the deal shall fall apart, poor African nations are the ones that suffer the most severely, and Small Island States (such as Maldives) will be the first ones to be buried under the sea. With better alternatives should the deal fall short, the Developed Nations have way more bargaining power, thus they can act cold-bloodedly calm in the face of this global crisis, in order to press their counterparts into making concessions.
(and in all areas of the COP15negotiation – mitigation, adaptation, technology, finance – the Developed Nations are all better off. And that serve as major powers to be manipulated during the talks)
Countries like China, while it may suffer more if it comes to deal-breaking, has been conducting two strategies simultaneously. Firstly of all, an alliance has been formed (the so-called “G77 and China”). At the beginning we have witnessed the 4-3-2 phenomenon of shifting alliances, but now things are pretty much solidified (but not without effort on China’s part). Secondly, China has been actively improving its BATNA (alternative). That’s why President Hu announced its ambitious goal (40~45% cut in 2020 as compared to 2005’s emission level) disregarding the grudges of regional/provincial governmental heads: it is a decision born not out of ambition, but of a lack of choice. China has sent a signal that it will not, and cannot, follow the historical industrialization path. It’s a win-or-fall gamble. Nevertheless, such alternative-buildings will only come to fruition in the next decade. As of now, China’s bargaining power is still weaker than the Developed Nations, as can be seen by the concession made on December 17th that it will set “standards of measurement” for its carbon emission (something that China did not wish to agree upon for the longest time, and was one of the major reasons of the Deadlock. This criteria was insisted by USA, which did not even ratify the Kyoto Protocol. The sheer fact that China abides to such a claim without sound legitimacy from USA’s part, signals the big nation’s weaker position).
What Japan did was considered a hardball tactic, but it only worked because of the structured coalition that backed it up. According to an UN PR staff’s private words to me, Sweden has sent a high-level negotiator to this session, so did New Zealand (USA on the other hand, sent a low-level negotiator to this session). Such acts signaled that the Developed Nations were ready to engage in a “serious negotiation”. Based on this premise, perhaps their tactics during the open session was to drive down the morale and patience level of their counterparts, thus making it easier to push for Developed Nations’ concessions during closed sessions (smaller groups), when the real deal-making should occur without public scrutiny.
With Ethiopia, Algeria, South Africa being the political centers, the African nations are very much united. Along with joint forces of China, India, and other emerging economies, the coalition of the Developed Nations have a good potential to make bargains. However, the inherent disadvantages (often associated with the population proportion in poverty, and the reasons mentioned above) make them start off in a much weaker position. (that’s also how the “Danish Text” scandal was exaggerated, by Developed Nations believing that Developing Nations were secretly aligned to make the deal favorable only to the richer nations.)
Nevertheless, the Developing Nations can leverage the public channel, antagonizing the industrialized countries for the lack of political will (and this can be a legitimate claim).
Moreover, with better structured negotiation tactics, they can do a much better job (for example, in the session above, Micronesia’s negotiator voiced rallying calls with dire passion. However, being a nation of small, scattered islands, her opponents all understood that playing hardball would make her lose composure, as her nation is the first one to sink. That deprives her of convincing power when negotiating with big players like the EU and Japan, without logical and tactical backing from China and India).
All in all, it was a frustrating session that made me learn plentiful.
I do not appreciate nations with greater power using subtle tactics to exploit those they are supposed to support, even though that is the way international relations usually work.
But everything else aside, people of all nations (ESPECIALLY those in the Developed Nations) DO wish to see leadership taking charge of creating a binding deal.
One more day, let’s see what happens.
